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Governing good, bad and ugly workplaces?  
Explaining the paradox of state-steered voluntarism in New Labour’s Skills Strategy 
 
Abstract 
The post-compulsory education and training system in the UK has long been defined as an 
archetypical voluntarist model. Yet, with the election of a New Labour government in 1997, the 
relationship between the state as supply-side provider of skills and employers as the demanders of 
skills began to subtly change. An additional rhetoric emerged in skills policy that suggested a role 
for the state to shape higher skills demands. This instigated a move towards what is here defined 
by the oxymoron ‘state-steered voluntarism’; an approach to the governance of skills which aimed 
to deliver both a ‘demand-led’ skills system, and a system to ‘lead demand’. Drawing on policy 
documents and interviews with key policy makers, this article offers an interpretive analysis of 
New Labour’s ideas about the nature of workplaces, and the role of the state and skills providers 
in response, that explains the existence of policy paradox. We find that New Labour articulated 
three distinct strategies for governing skills, depending on whether workplaces were perceived to 
have ‘good’, ‘bad’, or frankly ‘ugly’ skills aspirations. However, whilst this three-fold skills strategy 
seemingly served the purpose of containing multiple policy objectives and creating a graded role 
for state action, it was also prone to being used selectively by those with vested interests in UK 
skills policy (i.e. the representatives of businesses and employers and the representatives of 
employees and learners). 
 
Introduction 
 
Contemporary comparative literatures on post-compulsory education and training systems define 
the UK as an archetypal voluntarist model. A system directed by the private training decisions of 
economic actors, negotiated within the ‘black-box’ of the firm (Keep, 2002), and therefore largely 
driven by the ad hoc demands of employers (King, 1997; Brown et al, 2001; Page & Hillage, 2006).  
 
Within such a model, the role of the British state in shaping skills provision is largely restricted to 
managing the supply-side (designing and overseeing the implementation of various initiatives and 
programmes available to be taken up by employers’ should they so wish). A role it has taken on 
with increasing voracity (Keep, 2006). The stated aim is to ensure providers of education and 
training align themselves to the demands and preferences of employers’, and deliver the 
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economically valuable skills they require. However, it is a role performed in a political context 
which provides no incentive nor ascribes any responsibility on employers to exhibit actual demand 
for skills (Keep & Mayhew, 1996; Gleeson & Keep, 2004). It is this combination of weak voluntary 
demand for skills, and strong managerial control of supply which has, for many decades, 
preoccupied the critical literature concerned with the nature of the UK skills system (see for 
example, Keep, 2005; Keep, 2006; Keep 2007).  
 
However, with the election of a New Labour government in 1997, the relationship between the 
state as supply-side provider of skills and employers as the putative demanders of skill began to 
subtly change. Into the context of voluntarism of skills demand and managerialism of skills supply, 
emerged a new inflection in policy rhetoric that suggested a more interventionist role for the 
state. A role to shape the skills demands of individuals and businesses, directing them towards 
high(er) skills aspirations. This new inflection instigated a move towards what is here defined by 
the oxymoron ‘state-steered voluntarism’; an approach to the governance of skills in the 
UK/England which exhibited a new set of tensions created by the aim to deliver both a ‘demand-
led’ skills system, and a system to ‘lead demand’.  
 
“We must put employers’ needs for skills centre stage, managing the supply of training, skills 
and qualifications so that it responds directly to those needs. We must raise ambition in the 
demand for skill. We will only achieve increased productivity and competitiveness if more 
employers and more employees are encouraged and supported to make the necessary 
investment in skills” (DfES, 2003:8, emphasis added) 
 
Indeed, it is this emphasis on government responding to demand while, at the same time, seeking 
to raise demand that is the source of what may be seen as a paradox in English skill formation. 
 
This article seeks to explain the source and cause of this paradox, by considering the purpose of 
deliberate policy ambiguity. It asks the question: ‘How did New Labour seek to steer skill 
formation, and with what implications?’ Following this introduction, section two begins with a 
discussion of two different conceptual approaches to the analysis of the New Labour Skills Strategy. 
Having established that New Labour’s skills policy for England advocated the importance of a 
demand-led education and training system, it contrasts accounts that offer ‘policy failure’ as an 
explanation of the fate of New Labour’s project to lead demand, with accounts of deliberate policy 
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ambiguity to achieve multiple goals and objectives. As such, this section develops the framework 
for analysis. Section three then presents the analysis in detail. It draws out how skills policy under 
New Labour was described in policy documents and by senior policy-makers. Further divided into 
three sub-sections, it identifies New Labour’s three skills strategies. In each case illustrating how 
the state imagines employer and employee skill aspiration and behaviour, and describes the 
processes and practices of skill delivery accordingly. The fourth section concludes by bringing 
together these three skills strategies, to explain policy paradox as a consequence of the attempt at 
differentiated steering of workplaces in order to achieve different state projects associated with 
the better economic and social functioning of the nation. Finally, beyond its contribution to 
understanding how skill formation in England was governed by New Labour, the article begins to 
expose the weaknesses of state-steered voluntarism as a mode of changing workplace behaviour.  
 
Conceptualising New Labour’s approach to governing skills: policy failure vs. policy 
ambiguity 
 
While claiming to be ‘demand-led’ (driven by the economic needs and preferences of businesses’ 
and individuals’), the education and training system in England has become increasingly directed 
(designed and managed) by the state (Gleeson & Keep, 2004; Keep, 2006). The idea that the state 
should control the supply of skills in order to respond to employer demand is inherent to a state-
constructed utilitarian ‘new vocationalism’ agenda, that insists on the need for education and 
training to better align itself with the imagined high(er) skills requirements of the economy, but 
does not challenge the voluntarism of private decisions to train. The limitation of this approach to 
tackling the national low skills problem is that it fails to acknowledge the low demand for higher 
levels of skills among employers (Keep & Mayhew, 1996; Huddleston & Keep, 1999; Gleeson & 
Keep, 2004; Keep, 2005; Keep, 2012).  
 
Despite Finegold & Soskice’s (1988) explicit identification of a particular institutionalised ‘two-way’ 
relationship between demand and supply producing low-skills equilibrium in Britain (see also 
Wilson & Hogarth, 2003), periodic resurgence of concern over skill levels has tended to frame the 
problem as an issue of deficient supply (Keep & Mayhew, 1999; Lauder, 1999; Keep, 2002; Keep, 
2012). Indeed, the apparent historic failures of skills supply have been condemned by successive 
governments as the principal cause of the UK’s comparative productivity and competitiveness gap, 
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as well as persistent labour market inequalities and insecurities (Huddleston & Keep, 1999; Lloyd & 
Payne, 2002).  
 
Given that the concept of low skills equilibrium has typically been framed in such a way, we can 
easily expect the high(er) skills project of New Labour to be conceptualised, first and foremost, as 
a ‘demand-led’ strategy. However, the question of how we can properly account for the inflection 
in skills policy rhetoric that demand is to be led by the state remains. The answer can perhaps be 
found by considering old policy afflictions in new economic and social contexts, which have once 
again reinvigorated calls to urgently address the problem of low skills.  
 
Throughout successive New Labour administrations the critical need for higher skills occupied a 
pivotal position at the forefront of economic and social policy and policy debate. Fuelled by 
concerns about the competitive strength of the nation in a dynamic and technologically advance 
knowledge-based global economy1(Avis et al, 1996; Brown & Lauder, 1996; Aston & Green, 1996; 
Brown, 1999; Brown et al, 2001; Crouch et al, 2004), higher skills were fervently depicted as 
fundamental to sustaining business productivity and individual employability, and, therefore, as 
critical to enhancing national economic prosperity and ensuring (a particularly defined version of) 
distributive justice (Lloyd & Payne, 2002; Crouch et al, 2004; Pring, 2004; Hodgson et al, 2008; 
Keep et al, 2008; Payne, 2008).  
 
Given this economic context, we could wonder whether the inflection in the New Labour Skills 
Strategy that demand is to be led by the state represented a new logic of possibility for governing 
high(er) skills. Did it signal the start of a new state-market relationship, and mean that the explicit 
lack of responsibility ascribed to employers’ was to be addressed? If so, how can we account for an 
enduring commitment to a ‘demand-led’ strategy, and an ideological preference for voluntarism?  
 
The dominant answer arrived at by existing analysis is that the demand leading aspects of the New 
Labour Skills Strategy amounted to ‘policy failure’. Although for some skills policy scholars and 
commentators the election of New Labour was cause for guarded optimism (Brown & Lauder, 
1996), over time this optimism dissipated and their analysis identified a ‘rhetoric vs. reality’ gap 
(Keep, 1999; Gleeson & Keep, 2004; Payne, 2008). Just like successive governments before, New 
                                                 
1 The skill of the workforce has become associated with the capacity to adapt to and utilise new technologies, 
and adapt to and implement new forms of production, systems of work organisation, and ways of working 
(Rubery & Grimshaw, 2003:106 also Aston & Green, 1996) 
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Labour in office were shown to lack the willingness and ability to meaningfully intervene in the 
private training decisions of employers (Brown, 1999; Keep, 1999; Lauder, 1999; Coffield, 2002; 
Lloyd & Payne, 2003; Gleeson & Keep, 2004; Keep, 2006; Keep et al, 2008). The ‘tenacity of 
voluntarism’ (King, 1997), it was said, had once again trumped all other agendas, and in doing so 
had hollowed-out any putative commitment to tackling the demand-side of the UK’s skills problem. 
Furthermore, the retained insistence on the need to ensure a ‘demand-led’ system was seen as 
enabling employers to extend their claim to ‘rights’ over the shape and trajectory of skills policy 
(Gleeson & Keep, 2004). Rights which came at a considerable cost to other stakeholders and to 
wider social concerns about the form and functioning of the labour market (Avis et al, 1996; 
Coffield, 1999; Gleeson & Keep, 2004; Ball, 2008), and which again left government trying to raise 
skill levels by managing suppliers with an increasing iron grip (Grugulis et al, 2004; Keep, 2006; 
Wolf, 2007).   
 
In essence, the conclusions about New Labour being drawn here return us to where we started; to 
the recognition that skills policy in England suffers from the contradiction of managing education 
and training in service to the imagined high(er) skills needs of the economy, without challenging 
voluntarism as the cause of the low skills equilibrium and the source of low demand for skills. 
However, the limitation of this analysis is that whilst it can explain why policy stipulations that 
appeared to take seriously the intention to tackle the demand for skill failed, this is not the same 
as accounting for the very existence of such policy concerns in the first place. Indeed, in the last 
instance, such explanations tend to resort to writing-off this tension and smoothing out the 
contradiction it implies.  
 
In contrast, the intention here is to explain the existence of a paradox at the heart of the New 
Labour Skills Strategy for England. In doing so, we argue that ‘policy failure’ does not provide an 
adequate explanation of the co-existence and consequence of both demand-led and demand-
leading rhetoric in the New Labour Skills Strategy. Instead, we draw on approaches to the analysis 
of state projects that allow for the possibility of deliberate policy ambiguity, by illuminating the 
disparate discourses and objectives that give meaning and substance to governing strategies, and 
the unstable relations between them (Stone, 2012; Clarke, 2004:5).  
 
For Fairclough (2000:44), ambiguity was characteristic of the New Labour project. It was inherent 
to their insistence on the ‘reconciliation of opposites’ through the presentation of a ‘Third Way’ 
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that sought to remove (the perception of) conflicts within or between governing strategies (see 
also Newman, 2001; Hyland, 2002). Ambiguity reflects the possibility that “states might be more 
than one thing at once” (Clarke, 2004:2); may have more than one type of agenda; in relation to 
more than one type of imagined subject (Clarke, 2005). It reflects a state, with regard to skills 
policy, which was engaged in attempts to forge coherence between what Avis (1998:261) 
identifies as “remnants of earlier radical movements” (a residual commitment to old Labour’s 
concern with the management of the nation’s economic security and distributive social justice) 
and neoliberal convictions regarding the supremacy of market mechanisms for getting things done 
(Grugulis et al, 2004; Ball, 2007:10).  
 
In understanding political projects as defined by ‘ambiguity’, Newman & Clarke (2009:8-9) offer 
the concepts of “articulation” and “assemblage” to aid analysis of policy puzzles. They use the 
concept of articulation to denote the way in which ideas (for example, about how skills should be 
produced in relation to economic and social needs and preferences) are mobilised and recruited in 
order to forge persuasive projects, and subvert, silence and close down opposition and 
alternatives (Newman & Clarke, 2009:8-9; see also Newman, 2007; Ball 2007; Ball, 2008 for a 
discussion of the role of discourse in the production of meaningful political projects). They use the 
concept of assemblage to express and give visibility to the work that the state does to coordinate 
and align all the constitutive elements of the project - the types of employers and employees that 
constitute the subjects of policy, the form and function of the state, and the policies and practices 
for achieving the goals of the project - to shape an apparently coherent strategy (Newman & 
Clarke, 2009:9).  
 
Of course, the relationship between how particular projects are articulated and assembled is 
iterative.  Following Carmel & Papadopoulos (2003), we draw attention to the need to appreciate 
the mutually reinforcing dynamic that exists between the articulated logics, rationales and 
principles of public policies (what is to be governed), and the modes and mechanisms of governing 
that organise who is to be governed, how, and with what effects. This conceptual approach to 
understanding how states govern is useful in the context of studying skills policy, as it can 
distinguish the normative and meaningful logics that gave the New Labour Skills Strategy its 
inflection to be both demand-led and to lead demand, and can show how this obvious tension was 
perceived as reconcilable within the high(er) skills project.  
 
7 
 
Having discussed the limitations of extant skills policy analysis to account for the existence of 
policy paradox, and having outlined a conceptual approach that can be applied to (indeed insists 
upon) such an endeavour, the paper proceeds by identifying and explaining the ambiguity of skills 
policy rhetoric under New Labour. It offers an interpretive analysis of policy narrative. In line with 
the conceptual approach adopted, we start from the premise that policy is bounded political 
communication - not a one-off statement or directive, but a reinforced, re-inflected and reworked 
interactive momentum of discursively mediated ideas, decisions and actions (Ball, 2008:7) – to 
influence ways of understanding the world and the problems and solutions contained within it. 
Following Stone (2012), we understand the project of making policy to involve ‘political reasoning’, 
defined as “strategic portrayal [of a situation] for persuasion’s sake and, ultimately, for policy’s 
sake” (ibid:12). We trace the occurrence, reoccurrence and concurrence of ideas through New 
Labour skills policy, and use interpretative and discursive coding techniques to “demonstrate that 
politics and policy are grounded in subjective factors” (Fischer, 2003:14). As such, our aim is to 
reveal the ideas about workplaces, and the role of the state and skills providers as a response, that 
animated the New Labour Skills Strategy, and that explains the existence of policy paradox. 
 
The arguments advanced draw on analysis of seventeen core policy documents produced by New 
Labour administrations between 2001 and 2008 2  (see Appendix 1). Notwithstanding the 
differences between the types of documents3, the analysis is able to trace the existence of 
multiple, different and co-existing policy narratives employed throughout the period, which gave 
meaning to the way in which New Labour understood the problem of, and solution to, low skills. 
As is highlighted by the quote in the introduction, these multiple, different and co-existing 
narratives can appear in policy documents in very close proximity to each other (see also Wolf, 
2007 for a discussion of the contradictory nature of the Leitch Review of Skills).   
 
The documentary analysis is supported by four in-depth interviews with key policy-makers (a 
member of the House of Commons, a member of the House of Lords and two senior civil servants 
from the then Departments of Education and Skills) operating at the epicentre of Skills Strategy 
development at the time, and a number of relevant speeches by Minsters. The interviews were 
                                                 
2 Although New Labour defined their Skills Strategy for England as commencing with the publication of the 
‘21st Century Skills: Realising Our Potential – Individuals, Employers, Nation’ White Paper (2003), the review 
of relevant documents includes important agenda setting reports published prior to this. 
3 It is noted that the 2001 PIU Report – “In Demand – Adult Skills in the 21st Century” – particularly 
emphasises that skill is a derived demand, and therefore that economic policy needs to incentivise and 
support businesses to raise their demand for skills. 
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conducted with the explicit aim of offering explanation of the main tensions identified through 
documentary analysis, and as such are used to develop the conclusions. Particular analytical focus 
was placed on interpreting the different discursive constructions of workplaces in policy - 
distinguished by the nature of their demand for skills and their skills behaviour - and the effect of 
these for the ordering of relations between workplaces and the state and the organising of skills 
provision.  
 
 
New Labour’s three skills strategies  
 
The analysis presented below shows that New Labour imagined and described three different 
types of workplaces that exhibited different degrees of high(er) skills aspiration. In relation to 
these different workplaces, it is argued that three distinct strategies for governing skills can be 
extricated from within policy. The sections that follow take each of these in turn. They reveal how 
imagined workplaces (implying different relationships between employers and employees), the 
form and function of the state in response, and the corresponding practices and processes of skill 
delivery are assembled into distinct architectures of high(er) skills governance, in relation to 
particular state projects to ‘empower’, ‘enhance’ or ‘emancipate’ correct skills behaviour. As such, 
the analysis argues that the part of the New Labour Skills Strategy that insists demand for skills is 
to be led by the state should not be written off, but rather we should consider the consequences 
of the deliberate ambiguity of policy in pursuit of multiple co-existing goals. The analysis 
illuminates New Labour’s approach to the governance of skills as distinguishing between 
discursively constructed good, bad and frankly ugly workplaces, and, therefore, as instigating a 
move towards state-steered voluntarism. The implication of such an approach to governing skills is 
discussed. 
 
 
Responsible workplaces, the empowering state and the demand-led skills strategy 
 
The first of three distinct skills strategies for England under New Labour was aimed at imagined 
‘responsible workplaces’. New Labour policy narratives described a particular type of employer 
and employee - interacting at the site of the workplace - that understood on-going business and 
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employment success (productivity and employability) as exclusively dependent on the pursuit of 
high(er) skills.  
 
‘Enlightened employers’ were spoken about and spoken for as understanding that their survival 
and future prosperity would be fundamentally determined by having a better skilled workforce 
(Strategy Unit, 2002:2; UKCES, 2008a:3; DIUS, 2008b:4). Indeed, policy-makers explicitly presented 
desire and pressure for more and better skills as emanating from the bottom-up (Denham, 2007). 
These enlightened employers were neither indifferent to, nor sceptical of, the benefits of skills, 
and were not prepared to leave skills development to chance, or rely on reactive poaching 
strategies (Policy-maker 3).  
 
“I think we’ve past that stage where employers say ‘oh I don’t want my staffed trained’, you 
know, ‘I’ll go and head hunt from somewhere else if I want a skilled person’. I think most 
employers really do see that it’s their responsibility to help us [upskill].” (Policy-maker 4) 
 
Equally, ‘motivated employees’ were spoken about and spoken for as understanding their current 
employment security, as well as their future employment opportunities, to be dependent on the 
attainment of high(er) skills (DfES, 2005a:6; DIUS, 2008a:3). As such, policy-makers’ were again 
able to present the desire and pressure for more and better skills as emanating from the bottom-
up; from responsible and ambitious individuals actively seeking the advantages of further training 
(Denham, 2007).  
 
“Most people […] if you talk to them, to learners or to prospective learners, […] what they 
want is the qualification at the end of it so they can go and get a good job. So in a way they 
are the easiest of our stakeholders, because they’re on the same wave length as the policy.” 
(Policy-maker 4) 
 
In describing desire for more and better skills as emanating from enlightened business and 
motivated individuals, policy-makers presented a consensus around skills enhancement (Leitch, 
2006). Together, at the site of the imagined responsible workplace, employers and employees 
were conceptualised and narrated as partners in the high(er) skills vision. In response, policy 
narratives presented government as having an obligation to support the progressive skills 
ambitions of businesses and individuals. However, by defining skill as the manoeuvrability to cope 
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with the so-thought complexity of a dynamic economy, policy-makers presented any attempt to 
centrally plan skills needs as inherently problematic (PIU, 2001; DfES, 2005a).  
 
Keen to distance the state from any role in ‘picking winners’, policy-makers described this strategy 
as “getting on for tactically neutral” (Policy-maker 3), and afforded a privileged status to the 
interests of enlightened businesses and motivated individuals (Policy-maker 1). Indeed, business 
and individual investment in training was deemed only to be secured by ensuring that they were 
‘empowered’ to direct the skills project and product in accordance with their own motivations 
(Leitch, 2006: 48; see also DIUS, 2007a; DfES, 2005a). This depiction of an empowering role for the 
state to meet responsible private skills aspirations had corresponding implications for the way in 
which the institutional arrangements for skilling were considered best organised.  
 
Policy-makers presented a highly critical analysis of the hitherto ‘supply-led’ system. Described as 
a fallacious attempt to “predict and provide” (Leitch, 2006:48), it was considered to have 
resoundingly failed to meet the need for economically valuable skills. Specifically, policy-makers’ 
criticised past policies for being blindly focused on “process rather than product” (Policy-maker 2). 
Creating conditions, and enabling them to remain unchecked, in which self-serving funding bodies 
and colleges benefited from filling courses regardless of their utility for businesses and individuals 
(DfES, 2003:19; Policy-maker 3)4.  
 
To overcome these problems, policy-makers proposed new, as well as restructured, institutions of 
skills delivery, obliged to “adapt and respond” (Leitch, 2006:69) to the requirements of 
enlightened employers and motivated employees as ‘customers’ (Strategy Unit, 2002:2; DfES, 
2003:35; DIUS, 2007a:11). Specifically, policy-makers emphasised the importance of giving 
employers and employees ‘voice and choice’, to put them and their needs in the “driving seat” 
(DfES, 2006:35; DfES, 2005a:11) of a demand-led system (DIUS, 2007a; DIUS, 2007b)5.  
                                                 
4 Leitch (2006:12) reported that less than 10% of employer training is conducted in further education 
colleges, and interprets this as evidence that employers and employees – despite their enlightened and 
motivated skills aspirations - have become alienated from engagement with the publically-funded 
institutions of training and learning (Leitch, 2006:48).  
5 In general, policy-makers spoke of the need to “strengthen the employer voice” (Leitch, 2006:71; DIUS, 
2007a:36). However, the privileging of employer voice was justified as simultaneously the best way to 
ensure valuable training and learning opportunities for (potential) employees, by imagining employers as 
acting in ways that secure improved production strategies and therefore improved employment prospects 
(DfES, 2006:22).  The term ‘demand-led’ was therefore often, but not exclusively, synonymous with 
‘employer-led’. 
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The UK Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES) - established to “champion the 
development of an effective and more demand-led skills and employment system across the UK” 
(UKCES, 2009a:6) – was described as being ‘employer-led’ (UKCES, 2010:5). Equally, the Sector 
Skills Councils (SSCs)6 were described as set up to “build a skills system that is driven by employer 
demand” (UKCES, 2008a:4). In practice, policy-makers sought to give the term ‘employer-led’ 
meaning through the prescription that ‘eminent business leaders’ should have active and 
influential roles on the boards of organisations responsible for the implementation of skills policy 
(DUIS, 2007a:36; DIUS, 2008b:9). Indeed, for SSCs the critical test, upon which their very 
continuation was dependent (UKCES, 2008a:5), was their ability to “command powerful support 
from industry” (UKCES, 2008b:13).7   
 
However, all organisations within the institutional framework of skills delivery - both those newly 
established under the auspices of the New Labour Skills Strategy, and those that pre-existed this 
policy era - were (re)described as directed by the voice of employers’ and employees’. In particular, 
skills providers (following the Foster Review (2005) of the future role of Further Education 
Colleges) were described as having a core requirement to engage with, and enhance their 
understanding of, employers’ workforce skills needs, and (re)focus their activity accordingly (DIUS, 
2007a:7).  
 
The other important dimension to the remaking of businesses and individuals as skills ‘customers’ 
was illuminated in the way policy-makers narrated practices of increased choice. Again, when 
policy-makers promoted the need for greater priority to be given to the choices of customers, they 
drew specifically on their conceptualisation of businesses as ‘enlightened’ and individuals as 
‘motivated’; reemphasising the concordance of interests in high(er) skills, such that the national 
Skills Strategy was presented as principally functioning to liberate responsible private progressive 
aspirations (Policy-maker 3).  
 
                                                 
6 SSCs were established to replace the 73 former National Training Organisations. They were introduced in 
phases, initially licensed from 2003 to 2006, and relicensed and rationalised a number of times since.  
According to the UKCES (2008a:13; 2011) and the Alliance of Sector Skills Councils (ASSC) the network 
achieved approximately 90% coverage of workforce activity across the UK economy.  
7 SSCs underwent periodic relicensing, which involved audit and inspection of their functions undertaken by 
the UKCES with involvement from the National Audit Office. The 2008-2009 relicensing process principally 
focused on the degree to which the SSCs had achieved ‘employer engagement’. 
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To promote the exercise of choice, policy-makers extolled the virtues of mechanisms designed to 
boost the ‘purchasing power’ of both employers and employees, and contrasted them with what 
they described as the “you’ll-get-what-you’re-given” (Policy-maker 4)  approach to determining 
the training and learning offer available under a supply-led system. In policy documents, SSCs 
were charged to work with the businesses in their footprint to develop Sector Skills Agreements 
(SSAs) - described by policy-makers as a means of setting out the skills priorities of the sector - and 
establish a Sector Qualification Strategy (SQS) that reflected the skills employers, and therefore 
employees, find valuable (Leitch, 2006:74; DfES, 2006:22). In addition, policy advocated the 
benefits of routing significant proportions of the adult learning budget through Train to Gain, and 
Individual Skills Accounts.  
 
The Train to Gain service was introduced in 2006, and offered employers free or subsidised 
training for their lower skilled employees8 and brokerage to support them in translating their skills 
needs into relevant and sourced packages of study and qualification for their workforce (DfES, 
2006:40; LSC, 2007:3; DIUS, 2007a:56). Policy-makers claimed that the most important feature of 
Train to Gain was ensuring that funding for training and learning followed employer demand; 
describing this new process as a change for the better to the “balance of power” (Policy-maker 3) 
between customers and suppliers. Individual Skills Accounts9 were described as providing a 
mechanism for empowering individuals in exercising choices. Policy-makers claimed that they 
represented a kind of virtual funding (DIUS, 2007a:27) that followed the individual learner, and, it 
was asserted, enabled individuals to more freely select between types of provision and providers.  
 
Taken together, both the voice-led institutions and the choice-led policy mechanisms were 
narrated by policy-makers as empowering. They were described as designed by government to 
improve the responsiveness of the skills system to its customers, and as galvanising engagement 
with, and investment in, economically valuable skills training. 
 
“The advent of Skills Accounts and the growth of Train to Gain herald a radically different 
model of organisation of the skills system, where the role of Government is to ensure that 
                                                 
8 The New Labour Government introduced a new entitlement to a free first full NVQ level 2 qualification and, 
in specific cases, a free or subsidised NVQ level 3 qualification. Employers could access this entitlement via 
Train to Gain to fund training for their low skilled employees 
9 Learner Accounts were one of the recommendations of the Leitch Review of Skills (2006) piloted in 
2007/08 and rolled out across England in 2010.  
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customers are empowered, well-informed and well-supported, so that demand can lead 
supply”. (DCSF/DIUS, 2008:11) 
 
In summary, running through this element of New Labour’s skills policy was a distinct ‘demand-
led' strategy. Starting from a particular articulation of how the parties in the skills project 
behave, and the relationships between them – responsible workplaces - the corresponding 
response of the state and the form of skill delivery was assembled into an order and system of 
organisation that amounted to a particular governmental agenda to empower economic 
competitiveness and social prosperity. It is summarised below in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1: The demand-led strategy for skills  
 
Source: author’s analysis, compilation and design  
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The demand-led strategy represents one strand of state work to describe one version of the 
workplace and the role of the state and the skills system in response. However, this was not New 
Labour’s only strategy to tackle the problem of low skills in England. From within the so-thought 
‘coherent’ Skills Strategy for England (Foreword by Tony Blair – PIU, 2001:3), two further distinct 
skills strategies can be explicated. What underpins these additional architectures of skill 
governance is the reconstruction through policy rhetoric of different workplaces that operate 
without the necessary skill aspiration to mitigate dynamic economic uncertainty. In such 
workplaces, the problem of low skills was re-described by policy-makers as the consequence of 
lack of skills demand. We will firstly turn our attention to the description of imagined ‘inert’ 
workplace.  
 
Inert workplaces, the enhancing state and the strategy to lead demand 
 
“We have committed to joining the worlds ‘premier league’ for skills. This will require an 
enormous shift in attitudes and aspirations […]. For the Government, it means adopting a 
much more positive approach […]. It means encouraging people to raise their aspirations for 
themselves.” (DIUS, 2007a:3) 
 
Despite overwhelming pressures to up-rate their production and employment strategies, New 
Labour policy rhetoric described workplaces that exhibited deficient skills ambitions (DIUS, 
2007a:38). Imagined as principally suffering from a lack of capacity and capability to rethink and 
upgrade their skills attainment and utilisation, these workplaces were presented as unable to act 
in their own best interests. In other words, they were imagined as trapped in a short-termist low 
skills equilibrium (Finegold & Soskice, 1988; Wilson & Hogarth, 2003).  
 
This image of ‘inert workplaces’ was particularly exposed where policy presented and lamented 
past failures to embrace the potential of skills. Although in general policy-makers’ narratives 
tended to place blame for the national skills deficit with an imagined ossified and self-serving 
supply-led system, employer risk aversion (PIU, 2001:34), compounded by poor strategic 
management (Leitch, 2005:5) in a voluntarist system, was described as contributing to the 
problem. Contradicting the portrayal of ‘enlightened’ businesses as actively engaged in the up-
skilling of their low skilled workforce, a co-existing counter-narrative in policy presented a 
different type of employer, engaged in low skills product market and production strategies, as 
realising negligible returns from lower levels of training (Leitch, 2006:92; Policy-maker 4). 
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Policy rhetoric also presented an image of ‘inert’ individuals; equally described as less able to 
respond to the pressure to skill, and thereby enhance their employability in an uncertain and 
competitive labour market. Essentially this image encapsulated policy-makers articulation of low 
skills demand amongst low-skilled, low-paid employees, stuck in a trap of low skills ambition. What 
Gordon Brown MP – then Prime Minister - referred to as “inequalities in aspiration” (Brown, 2007). 
Specifically, low-skilled individuals were presented as experiencing barriers to training and 
learning that extended from low confidence (PIU, 2001:93; Leitch, 2006:106) and blocked their 
motivation to train (Leitch, 2006:103).  
 
“I don’t believe it is just the highly skilled; the wealthy; the well-educated who respond to 
incentives. I think everybody does that. But I think there is a resistance which is often borne 
out of inadequacy. I think it’s a fear of failure; it’s a fear of this isn’t quite for me.” (Policy-
maker 2) 
 
Whilst imagined ‘responsible’ workplaces were met by an ‘empowering’ state, the depiction of 
‘inert’ workplaces seemed to call into question the validity of leaving skills decisions to the whim 
of private interest. As such, policy-makers constructed and described an additional, inherently 
more interventionist role for the state; and in doing so they claimed to be setting the New Labour 
Administration apart from disinterested governments of the past.  
 
“We’ve accepted that the market isn’t perfect. And the way the market articulates demand - 
employers articulate demand - will not be perfect, and it will not meet all our sort of 
strategic needs. So you arrive at the conclusion that you do need, as government, to do 
something about it, or enable things to happen.” (Policy-maker 3) 
 
At the same time as stipulating that government should be “empowering people and employers to 
make the right training decisions for themselves” (Leitch, 2006:48), the role of the state was 
described in a co-existing but counter-narrative as ‘encouraging’ a changed workplace culture 
(PIU; 2001:53; HM Treasury, 2002:22; DfES, 2003:8; Brown, 2007; UKCES, 2010:5; Policy-maker 1). 
Whilst still declining to define the skills sought in substantive terms, what policy-makers presented 
was their discursively constructed right to define and communicate an aspirational vision for the 
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nation10 (PIU, 2001:61; Leitch, 2006:3; Brown, 2007). Their aim was presented quite simply as 
quantitatively more and higher skills. The ambitious targets set were described as a vehicle to 
communicate greater skill expectation (DIUS, 2007a:4), and as serving to direct and shape a sense 
of responsibility for the pursuit of betterment among employers and employees. Their rhetoric 
sought to normalise the requirement to excel beyond acceptance of low skills, and, as such, to be 
transformative and performative of the progressive skills behaviours required. Thus, whilst a 
partnership discourse remained present and critical in the policy narrative, given the role for an 
‘enhancing’ state the relations between the partners were fundamentally reordered. This policy 
rhetoric placed government squarely at the head of the partnership table, in a position to set and 
monitor the direction of travel for others to embrace and follow.  
 
This reordering of relations within the ‘skills partnership’ had significant ramifications for the way 
in which the role of skills providers was portrayed.  Although still described as being ‘demand-led’, 
the demand that led the system was also articulated in policy as to be encouraged, rather than 
existing. Although still described as a ‘new approach’ to workplace skills delivery, providers were 
reoriented from ‘responding’ towards ‘initiating’ change (PIU, 2001:55; DCSF/DIUS, 2008:12) 
through the depiction of a system to lead demand.   
 
“I think it is about giving people the opportunity, and managing the opportunity to change 
the way you are towards what is there for you. And the government has got to be able to 
make sure […] that those opportunities are there to change.”  (Policy-maker 1) 
 
In short, providers of skills were recast as leaders rather than followers in the Skills Strategy for 
England. Required to actively communicate rather than passively listen, and with a role to “try and 
win over hearts and minds about the benefits of skills” (Policy-maker 1).  
 
The UKCES – which in relation to imagined ‘responsible’ workplaces was described as exclusively 
employer-led - was also tasked with “the job to say what the nation needs” (Policy-maker 4); to 
communicate the skills ambition out to businesses, with the intention to “promote employer 
                                                 
10New Labour established a commitment (in England) to  meeting a series of higher-level qualification 
attainment goals, originally recommended in the Leitch Review of Skills (2006:3), and that came to be known 
as the ‘2020 ambition’ (DIUS, 2007a:9) These goals included 95% of adults to achieve basic skills of 
functional literacy and numeracy; more than 90% of adults qualified to NVQ level 2 or above; 1.9 million 
more adults to achieve an NVQ level 3 qualification; and 40% or more adults to achieve an NVQ level 4 
qualification or above. 
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investment in people and the better use of their skills at all levels” (DIUS, 2007a:38). In short, in 
relation to the imaginary of inert workplaces, the UKCES was described as required to take on the 
altered role of “driving forward the skills agenda” (Alan Johnson, MP cited in DCSF, 2007).  
 
The SSCs – also described as exclusively employer-led in relation to imagined responsible 
workplaces – were cast to “take a leading role” (Leitch, 2006:18), and to “raise employer ambition 
and investment in skills” (DIUS, 2007a:36). To champion, motivate and support engagement with 
education and training within their sector (HM Treasury, 2002:16; Leitch, 2006:74; UKCES, 2008a; 
UKCES, 2008b). To set ‘hard’ skills attainment targets for employers to deliver against (Leitch, 
2006:79), and require employers to clearly set out their commitment to participate in up-skilling 
their workforce in the SSAs.  
 
The role of brokerage as part of the Train to Gain offer was likewise remade. Described in relation 
to ‘inert’ workplaces as functioning to “encourage employers to see the benefit of higher skills” 
(DfES, 2005b:7). Similarly, policy-makers repositioned providers of Further Education 
(predominantly FE Colleges) as required to “achieve demanding targets […] persuading more 
employers of the value [of these qualifications] to them” (Denham, 2007). Essentially, policy-
makers envisaged a role for the FE sector to “increase the demand [for skills] from employers and 
potential learners”, by addressing “the cultural, social and economic factors which can limit 
aspiration and participation” (DfES, 2006:36; also Leitch, 2006:116). Individual Skills Accounts 
were, in response to inert employees, reconceptualised as a mechanism to ‘energise’ learning, and 
Information Advice and Guidance (IAG) advisors were re-tasked with an active role - based on 
“reaching out, rather than waiting for people to come” (Leitch, 2006:109) - to raise people’s 
awareness of their skills deficiencies (Leitch, 2006:110), and “steer” them to the courses that 
would best meet their needs (DfES, 2006:37).  
 
In summary, what is exposed is an additional policy narrative that significantly reconstructs the 
role of the skills delivery system in response to the image of inert workplaces and an enhancing 
role of the state. A narrative that depicted the need for a skills delivery system and set of policy 
tools to encourage employers and employees to raise their skills aspirations by leading skills 
demand. This strategy is based on an alternative articulation of how the parties in the skills project 
behave, and the relationships between them, assembled into an order and system of organisation 
that represents a distinctly different governmental agenda; to enhance concern for economic 
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competitiveness and social prosperity, and raise demand for skills. It is summarised below in 
Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: The strategy for leading demand for skills  
 
 
 
Source: author’s analysis, compilation and design  
 
Again, however, this is not the only way in which the New Labour constructed and responded to 
an imagined problem of low demand for skills. We now consider the second of the more 
negatively imagined workplaces – ‘irresponsible’ workplaces – and the co-existing strategy to 
mitigate or circumvent lack of demand. 
 
19 
 
Irresponsible workplaces, an exhorting/emancipating state, and the strategy to mitigate or 
circumvent lack of demand 
 
This final section of the empirical analysis describes the way in which policy rhetoric constructed 
‘irresponsible’ businesses or ‘irresponsible’ individuals as not only lacking requisite high(er) skills 
aspirations, but that furthermore demonstrated a deviant lack of interest in skills improvement. In 
general, policy-makers’ narratives tended to juxtapose skills deviant businesses and 
disempowered and vulnerable individuals, and skills deviant individuals and disempowered and 
vulnerable businesses.  
 
Policy-makers presented images of the “bad boss” (PIU, 2001:34) alongside images of the 
vulnerable employee, left behind as a consequence of being “trapped in a cycle of low-skilled, 
poorly-paid, often short-term employment with few training opportunities” (DIUS, 2007a:22). 
Drawing on survey data, in particular the National Employer Skills Survey (NESS), policy documents 
made repeated reference to an identified one-third of firms (35%) that had no training budget, 
persistently did no training at all, and ‘condemned’ eight million employees to go without training 
at the workplace (Leitch, 2006:12; DIUS, 2007a:37; DIUS, 2008b:4; UKCES, 2009b). Furthermore, 
even in those businesses that did train, the training that was done was identified as mostly 
unaccredited, and disproportionately weighted towards those with existing higher levels of skills 
and qualification attainment (Strategy Unit, 2002:12; DfES, 2005a; Leitch, 2006:50). In interviews, 
policy-makers offered an explanation of this behaviour as both representing the ‘bad bosses’ 
wanton disregard of lower-skilled workers as disposable and replaceable, and as serving to restrict 
the low-skilled workers employability potential in the wider labour market.  
 
“If they’re not an enlightened employer or anything it’s because they don’t want that person 
to be promotable elsewhere. It’s a protection; it’s like a handcuff. They’re handcuffing them 
into that organisation.” (Policy-maker 4) 
 
By undervaluing skills and low-skilled employees, policy-makers depicted ‘irresponsible’ 
businesses as the cause of the low skills problem.  
 
In addition, policy-makers’ narratives described a widespread lack of appetite to train among 
individuals (Leitch, 2006:2; PIU, 2001:35). In contrast to ‘inert’ individuals, portrayed as harbouring 
20 
 
latent progressive skills aspirations but facing barriers to training and learning, these irresponsible 
individuals were painted as having more deviant reasons – such as “lack of interest” (Leitch, 
2006:106) - for not engaging in their own skills development. Policy rhetoric insisted on the need 
for individuals to recognise their private responsibility with regard to skills development,  but in 
addition, to realise the extent to which they hold back aspirational businesses from developing the 
high(er) skills needed to stay competitive in dynamic economic conditions (Leitch, 2005:6). Policy 
documents pointed to employers’ persistent experience of skills deficiencies and shortages within 
their workforce and within the wider labour market that they recruit from (Leitch, 2005:6; Leitch, 
2006:41)11, as evidence of what they described to be the insufficient attention paid by these types 
of employees to their skill level.  
 
In response to ‘bad bosses’ and ‘bad workers’, New Labour presented a role of the state to exhort 
the need for changed behaviours, and therefore mitigate the effect of lack of demand for skills. 
Given what they identified as ‘irresponsible’ lack of skills aspiration, policy rhetoric urged these 
employers and employees to accept the obligation to alter their attitudes. In contrast to the 
portrayal of a high(er) skills consensus (whether manifest or latent) that either needed to be 
empowered or enhanced, ‘irresponsible’ businesses and individuals were described as needing to 
be checked and brought in line by the state (HM Treasury, 2002:20). Indeed, policy-makers 
presented a co-existing role for government to “inform people that they’re morally responsible” 
(Policy-maker 4) for skills development.  
 
Businesses were described as required to “play their part” by “raising their engagement in skills at 
all levels and using skills effectively” (Leitch, 2006:87); and to turn their backs on the exploitative 
deviance of operating in low skills equilibrium. Furthermore, and in support of the needs of UK plc’, 
policy rhetoric urged employers to take responsibility for the broader career development 
opportunities of their employees (HM Treasury, 2002:20). To investing in ‘portable skills’ and 
‘accredited training’ (Leitch, 2006:88) because, in the context of economic uncertainty, they 
recognised their ‘social’ responsibilities extended beyond their immediate business needs.  
 
                                                 
11 The NESS 2005 (cited in Leitch, 2006) reported one in four vacancies as ‘hard to fill’ due to the skills 
deficiencies of applicants, and 1.3 million employees as not fully proficient in their job. 
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 “You know, we want the business to do better if we have [employees] better skilled and 
everything else, but also to understand exactly what it means if they fall on hard times […] 
that they’ve equally got a responsibility there” (Policy-maker 1).  
 
Similarly, individuals were urged to change their behaviour; “demanding more of themselves” 
(Leitch, 2006:17), to ensure they could “play their part in a shared mission for world class skills” 
(Leitch, 2006:22). Policy emphasised the need for them to “feel that it is their responsibility to 
improve their skills throughout their lives” (DIUS, 2007a:7), and to “take responsibility for their 
personal career development, and be prepared to learn new skills” (HM Treasury, 2002:20).   
 
However, running alongside strong exhortation for businesses and individuals to change their 
behaviour, was the fundamental axiom – common to voluntarist systems - that governments 
cannot compel the actions of private actors. Given the absence of a strong commitment to 
compulsion12, there was a clear sense that where businesses and individuals refrained from 
changing their behaviours the inevitable consequences of declining productivity/profitability and 
employability was not the responsibility of the state.  
 
“You can lose your workforce or you can retain it. You can build your business to the next 
level or stay there and die. So it’s hard economics, and it’s not the government’s job to 
sustain low level business at all.” (Policy-maker 2) 
 
“The Government cannot promise people jobs for life. Nor can we promise to meet the cost 
of all the training and learning that people need. Individuals have to play their part, in terms 
of motivation, engagement and financial investment” (DfES, 2005a:17) 
 
In such cases, policy rhetoric described a role for the state and the skills providers to 
circumventing the ramifications of this deviant lack of demand; functioning ‘behind-the-scenes’ on 
behalf of, and in order to emancipate, the vulnerable other party in the employment relationship. 
                                                 
12 Although earlier policy documents did not rule out the possibility of enforcing a minimum level of 
engagement with training at the workplace, and the Leitch Review of Skills (2006) recommended revisiting 
the case for compulsion should adequate progress towards the 2020 ambition not be made on a voluntary 
basis (a recommendation that provided an ever present threat to incentivise the urged need for changed 
behaviours), these recommendations were uttered tentatively, and were invariably closely followed by a list 
of reservations about the effectiveness of any such measures and mechanisms (Leitch, 2006:94; DIUS, 
2007a:44; Policy-maker 1; Policy-maker 2). 
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In short, this version of the New Labour Skills Strategy for England was depicted as the means to 
free the progressive aspirations of disempowered individuals from the bondage of the ‘bad boss’ 
in the low-skills business, or the means by which businesses could free their progressive 
aspirations, otherwise suffocated by the indolence of the low-skilled ‘bad worker’. 
 
In response to the image of the irresponsible business, the organisations associated with skills 
delivery were recast in policy rhetoric with a distinct role to overcome the ‘selfishness’ of the ‘bad 
boss’. Policy-makers described the LSC’s quality control function, Train to Gain brokers, and Union 
Learning Representatives (ULRs), as not just responding to what employers want, but as requiring 
them to undertake a more holistic review of the skills needs of their entire workforce; particularly 
their lower-skilled employees. Thus, brokerage was not just described in policy narratives as a 
means of empowering employers, but also as presenting “a carrot and a stick” (Policy-maker 1); 
preventing them from ‘cherry-picking’ their engagement with skills, and making full qualification 
attainment – in the interest of the vulnerable worker - a condition of receipt of funding.  
 
The ‘Skills Pledge’ was introduced. Recommended in the Leitch Review of Skills (2006:4), it was 
described as a mechanism by which the leadership of a business could make a commitment to 
instigate a ‘new workplace partnership’ (DIUS, 2007a:54) by agreeing to train their workforce 
to a minimum of NVQ level 2 (DIUS, 2007a:53; DIUS, 2008b:9); and as a way for government to 
measure commitment towards the ‘2020 ambition’. Successive policy documents made 
reference to and commend the increasing number of ‘good’ employers who had signed up, 
thereby seeking to implicitly shame and stigmatise those deviant enough to continue to resist 
the pressure to reform their attitudes.  
 
In addition, New Labour consulted on and introduced a statutory right for employees to request 
time off for training, known as ‘time to train’, and presented it as a way of “giving all employees in 
England a right to a serious conversation with their employer about their skills development” (DIUS, 
2008b:4). A means for vulnerable employees, denied access to training in the past, to “make 
demands at the workplace” (Policy-maker 2) in relation to their own skills development (DIUS, 
2008b:11).  
 
The introduction of Individual Skills Accounts (and the associated IAG) was likewise presented as 
giving disempowered employees back agency and leverage over their own circumstances. Giving 
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them ‘control’ in skills decision-making as a result of having options to “develop their careers away 
from their existing employer or alongside their current jobs” (Leitch, 2006:24; see also DIUS, 
2007a:27; DfES, 2003:17). In this way, this version of the Skills Strategy withdrew further from 
taking responsibility for the inevitable failure of irresponsible businesses, and instead sought to 
operate ‘behind-the-scenes’ to enable vulnerable workers to circumvent the lack of demand for 
skill displayed by their deviant employer. It sought to help develop and enhance their progressive 
aspirations, and ultimately ensure means by which they could reposition themselves more 
favourably in relation to the better functioning parts of the labour market. As one policy-maker 
succinctly explained, 
 
“I don’t think anyone’s going to regulate call centres to say you have to have an NVQ. There 
are call centre qualifications, but I don’t think anyone’s going to regulate and say you have 
to do that. And people, I’m sure, get treated extremely badly in some of them. Is the 
objective of skills policy to get them treated better? Probably not, but the objective of the 
Skills Strategy might well be to give them the qualifications so they can choose not to be 
employed there anymore” (Policy-maker 3) 
 
Equally, in response to the image of the ‘bad worker’ the institutions and mechanisms of skills 
delivery were reconceptualised and described as functioning to overcome indolence, and release 
the ambitions of businesses from the suffocating burden of their employees lack of skills aspiration. 
The role of brokerage as part of the Train to Gain offer was recast in policy rhetoric as serving to 
raise employers’ awareness of the skills shortages they face by diagnosing the deficiencies within 
their existing workforce; raising awareness of the implications of these deficiencies; and 
identifying relevant, economically valuable, education and training programmes that met their 
business need (Leitch, 2006:91; DIUS, 2008b:6). Elevating this “economic mission” (DfES, 2006:5) 
to the centre of the skills strategies aims, was described as a way of giving employers’ back 
‘control’ (Leitch, 2006: 82) over skills decision making, and as again emancipating them from the 
lack of demand for skills amongst irresponsible individuals. Finally, policy-makers narratives also 
reconceptualised the Skills Pledge from a commitment by employers to train their low-skilled 
employees, to a statement of intention made by employers to set the tone in relation to what is 
expected of low-skilled employees. Employers were described as being able to use the Pledged 
commitment to drive up skills, productivity and performance in the workplace (DIUS, 2008b:9).  
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Overall then, the last of three strategies for skills for England under New Labour can be identified 
as a distinct agenda to mitigate and circumvent lack of demand for skills. Based on the 
articulation of workplaces as producing vulnerabilities, the governmental project was re-described 
as exhorting betterness, or ‘working behind the scenes’ to emancipate the victimised party in the 
employment relationship (either individuals working for ‘bad bosses’ or businesses burdened by 
‘bad workers’). This ordering of relations between workplaces, the state and the institutions of 
skills delivery, and the system of organisation for the governance of high(er) skills, is armed with 
justification narratives associated with the promotion of a (particular type of social justice) or 
greater economic prosperity, respectively. It is summarised below in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: The strategy for mitigating and circumventing lack of demand 
 
 
Source: author’s analysis, compilation and design  
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Conclusions and implications 
 
This paper identified a paradox at the heart of the New Labour Skills Strategy for England, 
captured in the tension between a demand-led strategy for skills, and a strategy wherein demand 
was to be led by the state. This tension was unable to be fully accounted for as a straightforward 
continuation of the chronic affliction that besets skills policymaking in England; that successive 
governments’ have constructed and managed the role of education and training in service to the 
needs and demands of the economy, without challenging actually-existing low employer demand 
for skills (Keep & Mayhew, 1996; Keep, 2002; Keep 2006). Indeed, any analysis of ‘business-as-
usual’ demand-side voluntarism and supply-side managerialism problematically writes-off the 
elements of New Labour’s policy rhetoric that carved out and constructed a role for the state to 
lead skills demand.  
 
In contrast, we have argued that it is essential not to under-theorise the ambiguity and messiness 
of state projects and state work. Any endeavour to engage with New Labour’s contribution to skill 
policy in England must be understood as framed within a broader commitment to a hybrid ‘Third 
Way’ reconciliation of social democratic and neo-liberal convictions (Fairclough, 2000; Newman, 
2001),and remain open to the ways in which rhetorical claims of policy coherence mask the 
incoherence of multiple political rationalities (Newman, 2005).  
 
Indeed, we have shown that within what is framed as a “coherent approach” (Foreword by Tony 
Blair – PIU, 2001:3), New Labour articulated three distinct strategies for governing skills. These 
distinct strategies were determined, in the first instance, by the degree to which imagined 
workplaces were perceived to have progressive high(er) skills aspirations. More specifically, we 
have argued that these identified distinct skills strategies for England represented state work to 
categorise different images of workplaces that justified different ways of ordering and organising 
‘the doing of skills’. State work that involved assembling the component parts of the skills project 
into distinct architectures of high(er) skills governance – the operational dimension of skills policy - 
in relation to how the problem of low skills was articulated – the formal dimension of skills policy 
(Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003).  
 
In the different strategies the ordering of relations between the parties in the Skills Strategy and 
the role of the state changes, as the differently imagined workplaces are brought into alignment 
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with and engaged in differently imagined state projects to ‘empower’, ‘enhance’ or ‘emancipate’ 
better economic and social functioning. In effect, parties in the Skills Strategy encounter a 
different ‘type’ of state and state work, depending on how they are imagined; state work to retain 
the prerogative of employers and employees to make education and training decisions for 
themselves, so long as they are the ‘right’ high(er) skills decisions, or, if not, a project to change 
the skills aspirations and fortunes of workplaces. This leads to the same policy tools being re-
described in policy rhetoric as having very different functions. For example, Train to Gain is 
described as both a way to support employer empowerment and deliver the skills they demand, 
and as a way for brokers and skills providers to encourage inert businesses and require 
irresponsible business to change their offer of training to employees. By offering such an account 
of the source and cause of paradox, the central argument is that the governance of skills under 
New Labour can be explained and understood as an attempt at ‘state-steered’ voluntarism 
through the co-existence of three distinct strategic regimes.  
 
However, whilst this three-fold skills strategy seemingly served the purpose of containing multiple 
policy objectives at once and creating a graded role for state action, it was also prone to being 
used selectively by those with vested interests in UK skills policy. For example, the representatives 
of businesses and employers (e.g. the Confederation of British Industries, the Institute of Directors 
and the Federation of Small Businesses), and the representatives of employees and learners (e.g. 
the Trade Union Congress, Unionlearn and the National Institute of Adult and Continuing 
Education).. In fact, elsewhere (Durrant, 2012) we have shown that employers’ and employees’ 
seize the opacity written into the policy to rearrange roles and responsibilities according to their 
own interests, and ultimately to derail any (albeit discursively constructed) roles and responsibility 
that policy rhetoric places on them to uprate their training and skilling aspirations and behaviours. 
This may account, in part, for why the New Labour Skills Strategy seems not to have had the 
intended effect on employer training efforts (Green et al, 2013; Mason & Bishop, 2010). 
 
The implications for policy of this analysis of the New Labour Skills Strategy for England are 
therefore also associated with the ‘problem of policy opacity’. Arguably the recognition that state 
policies to ‘empower’, ‘enhance’, and ‘emancipate’ economic competitiveness and better social 
functioning are different projects and should be treated as such. Even if we accept the broad 
contention that high(er) skills are to be about the ability to cope in conditions of dynamic 
economic uncertainty - an acceptance replete with all the problems of who and what this logic 
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privileges, particularly given the inequality of starting positions - then entangling and collapsing 
the normative distinction between ‘good’, ‘bad’, and frankly ‘ugly’ workplaces disrupts and derails 
policy intentions.  
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Appendix 1: Index of core documents: the New Labour ‘Skills Strategy’ (for England) 
 
Title of Document Author Type of Document Date 
In Demand: Adult Skills in the 21st Century PIU Report 2001 
In Demand: Adult Skills in the 21st Century – part 2 Strategy Unit Report 2002 
Developing Workforce Skills: Piloting a new approach HM Treasury Report 2002 
21st Century Skills: Realising Our Potential – Individuals, Employers, Nation DfES White Paper 2003 
Getting on in business, getting on in work – part 1 DfES White Paper 2005 
Getting on in business, getting on in work – part 2 DfES White Paper 2005 
Getting on in business, getting on in work – part 3 DfES White Paper 2005 
Further Education: Raising Skills, Improving Life Chances DfES White Paper 2006 
Leitch Review of Skills - Skills in the UK: The long term challenge Leitch  
(HM Treasury) 
Commissioned Report: 
Interim Report 
2005 
Leitch Review of Skills - Prosperity for all in the global economy: world class skills Leitch  
(HM Treasury) 
Commissioned Report: 
Final Report 
2006 
World Class Skills: Implementing the Leitch Review of Skills in England DIUS White Paper 2007 
Time to Train: Consulting on a new right to request time to train for employees in 
England 
DIUS Consultation Document 2008 
Shaping the future: a new adult advancement and careers service for England DIUS Prospectus 2008 
Raising Expectations: Enabling the system to deliver DCSF & DIUS Consultation Document 2008 
Train to Gain: A plan for growth – November 2007-July 2011 LSC Report 2007 
Empowering Employers: Building Employer Influence - Relicensing Sector Skills Councils UKCES Guidance Document 2008 
Empowering SSCs: Employer driven skills reform across the UK - A Relicensing 
Framework for Sector Skills Councils 
UKCES Guidance Document 2008 
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